Review mechanisms can play a role in managing the relationship between the parties.
Introduction
Large-scale investments in extractive industries can be plagued by demands for renegotiation, sometimes leading to arbitration or litigation and causing a breakdown in the relationship between the host country and the investor. The nature of these investments -longterm, lasting for 20 to 50 years or longer -means that it can be difficult to predict at the outset what conditions will exist over the course of the investment. It is very likely that the circumstances at the time the original agreement is entered into will change, driven for example by resource cycles or a changing political environment. 
Key Points
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A new approach may be to provide objective criteria in the contract at the outset, for the parties to determine whether a renegotiation should occur and if so, the parameters of the renegotiation.
CCSI Briefing Note 1 2
As the balance of risks and benefits changes, parties request modifications to the terms and conditions of the investment . Accordingly, mechanisms are needed in these agreements to smooth the process of dealing with the inevitability of changing circumstances. "Periodic Review Mechanisms", provisions that formally require parties to meet at particular intervals to review the terms of the contract or license and consider whether circumstances have changed since the parties' initial agreement, are one such mechanism. Contractually provided periodic reviews give the parties an opportunity to negotiate and readjust contractual provisions. Worst case scenarios often arise out of long term frustration by one or several of the parties which can result in expropriations with years of ensuing litigation or international arbitration. Provided that the parties take advantage of the opportunity to renegotiate terms, the contract terms and conditions can be readjusted before the parties are so desperate and frustrated that the investor decides to stop work or the Government decides to terminate permits and concessions Although the focus of this brief is on Periodic Review Mechanisms (Section 3), the fourth section will consider mechanisms that are not initiated periodically but at the request of one of the parties (At Request Review Mechanisms), providing additional insight into the issue of the parties' obligations to modify the contract (Section 4). Section 5 identifies problems that arise in practice under Periodic Review Mechanism and Section 6 outlines a new approach to the review of contracts -providing objective criteria for the parties to determine whether a renegotiation should occur and if so, the parameters of the renegotiation. The final section will look at strengths and weaknesses of the Periodic and At Request Review Mechanisms, and suggest ways to strengthen obligations if the parties so decided (Section 7).
Review mechanisms -Overview
Annex 1 sets out clauses containing review mechanisms from two contracts (Mining Contract 2 and Oil Contract 10). Each contains three types of review process (which are not mutually exclusive), broadly described as follows: a. A regular meeting between the parties, once every five (5) years, to discuss in good faith whether any modifications are required to the terms of the contract in light of "any substantial changes in circumstance" (in Oil Contract 10, this periodic meeting only occurs if a party requests it with 45 days' notice). This review process is referred to in this brief as "Periodic Review", as it envisages a meeting between the parties at regular intervals. b. An "on-demand" meeting, if either party makes a request on the basis that a particular event (Trigger Event) has occurred such that the contract requires modifications. In the examples in Annex 1, the Trigger Event is a "Profound Change of Circumstance" (PCC -described in Section 3.2 below). The parties must meet to determine whether a PCC has occurred, and if so must discuss in good faith any changes required to the contract. This review process is referred to in this brief as "Trigger-At-Request-Review", as the meeting may take place at any time upon a party's request, but the parties only discuss changes to the contract if they establish a particular Trigger Event has occurred (i.e., PCC). c. An "on-demand" meeting at any time that a party requests, to discuss any matter "affecting the 3 rights and obligations of the parties". The parties must discuss in good faith the matter raised. This type of review process is referred to in this brief as an "Automatic-At-Request-Review" as either party can request it at any time without the need to establish a Trigger Event.
These different review processes broadly represent the procedures set forth in many of the contracts reviewed herein, although each contract's provisions may vary slightly from the above provisions.
In the contracts reviewed, the "Review Process" can be described by the following elements. 
Periodic Review in Liberian Contracts
In the contracts reviewed for this Brief, seven (7) In conclusion, the language used in the Periodic Review Mechanisms clearly leaves consensus to modify the contract solely in the hands of the parties. If there is no agreement, no modification is made. The only real obligation in the majority of contracts is the duty to act in good faith while discussing and considering possible modifications to the contract, but most contracts do not provide parameters as to what will be considered "good faith". One contract that does provide some guidance, emphasizes that there is no requirement to make any changes, stipulating that: 
At-Request-Review in Liberian Contracts
As illustrated in Section 2 above, in addition to the Periodic Review Mechanisms, there are two types of At Request Review Mechanisms in the Liberian contracts. Both include a consultation that is initiated by the request of one of the parties. However, some clauses require the parties to establish that a Trigger Event has occurred in order to start the Modification Process when the parties meet (Trigger-At-RequestReview), while for others, the request itself sets the Modification Process in motion (Automatic-At-RequestReview). The obligations of the parties to agree to any modifications to the contract are weaker for the Automatic-At-Request-Review than for the Trigger-AtRequest-Review.
Initiation of the At Request Review
Both At-Request-Review Mechanisms can be initiated by the request of one of the parties, at any time. In Trigger-At-Request-Review mechanisms, the request usually must be based on the perception by the party making the request that a particular Trigger Event has occurred (i.e., PCC) and in all cases the parties only discuss changes to the contract if they agree that a Trigger Event has occurred.
Trigger Event in Trigger-At-Request-Review
In the Liberian contracts, the The obligations of the parties during the Modification Process of the Trigger-At-Request-Review clauses are very similar to those in the Periodic Review clauses, in general a requirement that the parties make any changes that they agree "in good faith" are necessary. xix Automatic-At-Request-Review clauses provide even weaker obligations for the parties to agree to any modification proposals made by the other side: "the parties shall take such action, if any, that is mutually agreed to address the matter." 
Issues encountered in practice
As this review indicates, many Periodic Review clauses have very broad and imprecise wording. This gives rise to disagreements over whether or not the circumstances alleged by one party can justify a renegotiation or whether or not a Trigger Event has occurred. Thus, instead of negotiating, for example, new financial terms and work schedules, the parties exhaust much time, effort and initial goodwill arguing over the pertinence and reality of the facts alleged by one of the parties. Over time, goodwill often turns to bad faith negotiations with allegations that the numbers produced by one of the parties are not trustworthy and cannot be relied upon as the basis to renegotiate terms and conditions. The higher the financial stakes, the more unlikely the parties will agree that events have resulted in a grave disequilibrium in the contract conditions.
The parties use many arguments to justify the status quo, depending upon which party has benefited from the alleged change in circumstances.
The investor which benefits from a windfall profit often will argue against a renegotiation requested by the Government by stating that the sudden rise in prices of the commodity (for example) was foreseeable in long term contracts and that the new-found profit is a fair return for the assumed project risk. Moreover, it will argue that since it pays more taxes (if such is the case), the Government benefits from the increased tax revenue.
If the issue is a prolonged investor loss as opposed to a windfall profit, the investor often will argue that unforeseeable geological challenges or a drop in the commodity prices (for example) makes its investment worthless or much less valuable to it thereby setting the scene for a work stoppage to force negotiations. Similarly, the same argument can be made in the case of Government-initiated modifications to the tax regime in the absence of freezing or stabilization clauses. In response to commodity price decreases or geological challenges, the Government can argue that a sharp rise or fall in commodity prices is foreseeable (even if it is forced to admit that the timing and extent of the variations in price are not) and that the investor assumed the risk of geological challenges.
In order to mitigate or eliminate Government-initiated modifications in the tax regime, investors most often require tax stabilization which affords foreseeability at least for one of the elements used to calculate the return on investment (ROI). However, such stabilization does not address all of the other variables in long-term extractive industry contracts.
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Although the above arguments appear reasonable, depending upon which party is making them and under which circumstances, a Government is likely reluctant to sit down with investors to readjust royalties, tax benefits and the like when prices fall and/or the quality or quantity of the commodity is less advantageous than forecast and/or the geology turns out to be much more difficult than foreseen, and an investor will be reluctant to discuss with the Government readjusting financial terms when it is experiencing windfall profits.
A new approach
The approach -setting objective criteria
Circumscribing the scope of negotiations and accusations of the use of unreliable data, by using objective criteria and supporting financial data to calculate a base line for the parties' financial expectations may increase the chance of success in Periodic Reviews. The purpose of the base line calculations is to share the partners' financial expectations at the beginning of the project. These expectations would be reexamined by comparing the base line figures with actual figures at contractually defined intervals or at party requested intervals or both, to ascertain whether circumstances have resulted in the financial reality for one or several of the parties being very far off the base line expectations such that renegotiations are warranted. If the investor's projections turn out to be wildly off base, it is likely that the Government's revenue projections will be as well, thereby giving the parties a reality based incentive to renegotiate.
The base line calculations would be attached to the contractual framework when it is first negotiated and signed. For example, in the Schedule setting out the investor's investment requirements (work schedules, amounts to be invested etc.), the investor could set out its expected ROI for each phase of the project (feasibility study, exploration, infrastructure construction, commercial production and sale phases of the project etc.). The more information and data shared by the investor in calculating its ROI, the more reliable the base line will be. The investor's base line could take the form of a mathematical formula wherein its numbers affecting the future profitability of the project are inserted (CAPEX, OPEX, financial costs not accounted for in the CAPEX, projected average sale price of commodity, etc.), to predict a projected ROI during each of the major phases of the project (which could be a loss for example for the feasibility and exploration stage). This method would not necessarily require the investor to divulge all of the detailed data used to calculate its projected CAPEX and OPEX, but it would hold the investor responsible for its projected base line ROI for each stage of the project, in order to evaluate whether or not the financial and other conditions of the contract should be renegotiated.
For the Government, the projections of revenue from royalties, land fees, taxes etc. and the time line for their receipt would also be attached to the contractual framework. The Government calculations will, to a large extent, rely on the investor's projections of quantities, quality and sale price but the Government could conceivably arrive at its revenue projections through independent analysis, which is always preferable to relying solely on the investor's figures.
Data required
To ensure reliable long term numbers, the data for each stage of the project would be input into the formula during each stage of the project and the cumulated ROI would be exchanged by the parties at contractually defined periods during each project stage or upon the request of one of the parties or both. If the resulting ROI calculations vary by more than one or several negotiated fixed percentage(s), the parties would be obligated to renegotiate in order to attain or readjust their respective expectations as set forth in the initial contractual framework. The parties could also decide to modify the base line figures and the percentage of difference that will trigger a renegotiation. Moreover, different percentages could be used for different stages of the project; if the parties feel that the application of one sole percentage (difference of more or less than 10% of the base line ROI, for example) would not take into account all of the variables. Furthermore, the percentage should be 7 applied in both upturn and downturn situations: ROI higher or lower than that projected in the contractual documents.
The factors which can be renegotiated are numerous: tax holidays, incentives, rates, customs duties, depreciation methods, royalty rates, income tax, land fees, fees on transportation infrastructure (if a fee sharing method has been adopted for rail cars, highways etc), when these issues are set forth in contractual arrangements, rather than in the country's law. The permit validity period and work obligations could also be adjusted to permit a longer (or shorter) period for the recovery of CAPEX by the investor.
Detailed financial information required
A major issue in the negotiation of extractive contracts is the unequal knowledge base of the contracting parties. Investors inevitably have more information at hand to make savvy investment decisions. Governments, on the other hand, have difficulty getting evaluations of their mineral or hydrocarbon reserves from neutral third parties due to cost constraints as they do not have easy access to the economic and financial experts needed to construct realistic tax, royalties, production sharing and other essential economic and financial projections xxi .
The primary purpose of setting forth detailed financial expectations in the contractual framework is to permit the parties to set a mutually agreed base line for financial returns for each of the parties. The numbers and assumptions used by investors and their lenders to decide whether or not to invest are crucial information which, if shared in a confidential, commercially constructive manner, would serve to build trust between the partners in the investment and allow for renegotiations based on objective criteria depending upon the stage of the project and which party has incurred the cost: the cost of digging/drilling/excavation, the cost of bringing water and electricity to the site, the cost of relocating populations, the quality of the commodity extracted which will affect its sale price, the actual tonnage which can be extracted at a reasonable rate of ROI, the cost of transportation of the commodity to bring it to sale to third parties etc.
The same is true for the Government: the calculations by the Government's economists of tax and royalty revenue and other financial considerations must be taken into account in order to evaluate whether or not the numbers for the royalty percentage, land fees, income tax rate calculations etc. are reasonable and close to accurate or mistaken, grossly erroneous etc. so that the negotiations can be based on the parties real interests and not on secret and undocumented calculations.
This "mathematical" method would have an additional advantage of forcing the contracting parties to be transparent and share their knowledge and financial expectations.
Dealing with confidentiality
A key problem with this approach is convincing investors to share their information and know-how, which is often considered proprietary. Certain investors understandably will not want to divulge such information. However, if information, data and financial projections can be "sanitized" and if the other partners/parties are obliged to respect confidentiality subject to stiff automatic penalties, there may be room for the exchange of sufficient data to make this method work.
For example, the data used to establish feasibility studies could be licensed to the Government on an exclusive basis for a modest fee. This could give the data the intellectual property protections required to reassure the investor, while giving the Government access to valuable data concerning its own reserves. The license fee could be incorporated into the royalty for a fixed period of time. To make this type of arrangement work, the investor would have to communicate to the Government the cost of the feasibility study so that the Government's payment for its use makes commercial sense. Perhaps, the Government would want to purchase the data and the feasibility study for its cost plus a small percentage. At the very least, the parties can give the data and the feasibility study a value to be taken into account when calculating the ROI of the investor and the ROI of the Government.
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Conclusions
The analysis shows that the importance of review provisions rests in their ability to maintain dialogue between the parties and to create an opening to discuss changed circumstances and the potential for revision, in situations that perhaps the parties could not have listed with any specificity at the outset. The Periodic Review Mechanisms identified tend to impose an obligation to discuss; the parties are required to meet and consult, but there is little obligation for them to make any changes to the contract during a review. In many cases the only requirement is that the parties act in good faith. While the contracts reviewed rarely define "good faith" in this context, it would be worthwhile considering how arbitral tribunals have interpreted this term. Further, most Review Mechanisms provide for the continuation of the original contract provisions if the parties fail to agree to any modification, adding to the lack of bite that some practitioners attribute to Periodic Review Mechanisms. The analysis also showed that a number of contracts contain three separate avenues for consultation between the parties. Given the absence of obligations in each to do more than hold good faith discussions, the question may be raised as to whether the potential use of three different ineffective procedures is efficient and constructive..
If the parties do wish to ensure that contract modification is seriously considered during each consultation, stronger obligations need to be included during the Modification Process. The review did reflect some options. As stated above, one clause stipulated that certain tax exemptions would expire unless they are renewed by the agreement of the parties during the review process. This type of clause would provide impetus to the investor to enter into serious discussions in relation to the contract terms. Such a mechanism could potentially be extended to other provisions of the contract that are perceived as likely to require adaptation over the duration of the investment, such as any tax or royalty rate, especially if they are fixed, and any exemptions. Alternatively, an entirely new approach could be adopted whereby the parties share, at the outset, their financial expectations over the course of the project to create a baseline reflecting these expectations. This 9 baseline can be reviewed over the duration of the project in order to determine, objectively, whether there is a need for renegotiation -in cases where either party's financial expectations are not being met.
Despite their problems, Periodic Review Mechanisms can still play an important role. These mechanisms can be the only provision under which a government can request changes to the terms of the contract where the balance of benefits changes in light of changed circumstances. For example, it was suggested by practitioners that the mechanisms can add legitimacy to a request by a government for amendments when changed circumstances in the market result in the investor receiving an unexpected level of profit. This contrasts with other mechanisms that often apply unilaterally to the investor, providing for adjustment to the contract terms to restore the economic equilibrium expected under the contract, where there has been a change (generally government legislation) affecting the investor's share of benefits. xxv On the part of the investor, Periodic Review Mechanisms can be used internally to convince others within the company that changes are necessary, where they are seen as desirable for business or political purposes. From this perspective, the mechanisms can provide a legal underpinning for parties seeking to achieve a business or relationship imperative. In any event, the Review Mechanism may play an important role in managing the relationship between the parties and in particular in managing the process of renegotiation. At the very least, they act to keep the parties talking to each other over the course of the investment. 30.2 Five Year Review. This Agreement shall be subject to periodic review once every five (5) years after the date of the start of Production for the purpose of good faith discussions to effect such modifications to this Agreement as may be necessary or desirable in the light of any substantial changes in circumstances which may have occurred during the previous five years.
30.3 Other Consultation. In addition to the consultation and review provided by Section 30 [...], each party may at any time request a consultation with the other party with respect to any matter affecting the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to this Agreement or any matter relating to Operations. The parties shall meet to review in good faith the matter raised as soon after such request as is reasonably convenient for them both. Subsequent to such consultation, the parties shall take such action, if any, that is mutually agreed to address the matter."
Oil Contract 10 -Section 36.2 Profound Change in Circumstances "(a) The State and the Contractor shall meet if the State or the Contractor gives at least forty-five (45) days' Notice to the other that it reasonably considers a Profound Change in Circumstances to have occurred. At the meeting, the State and the Contractor shall review the relevant facts and circumstances and determine whether or not a Profound Change in Circumstances has occurred. To the extent that a Profound Change in Circumstances has occurred, the State and the Contractor shall enter into good faith discussions to consider and shall make such modifications to this Contract as they may through good faith discussions propose as necessary or appropriate to restore the economic, fiscal and financial balance of the Contract… (c) In addition to the review provided for in Article 36.2(a), the State and the Contractor shall also meet once every five (5) years after the Effective Date, on at least forty five (45) days' prior Notice at the request of either, to review and discuss in good faith issues deemed material to the rights and obligations of the State and the Contractor pursuant to this Contract by the requesting party. The Parties shall effect such modifications to this Contract that the Parties in good faith discussions agree are necessary. (f) For the purposes of Articles 36.2(a) through 36.2(d), "good faith discussions" and "consultation" shall not require a Party to agree to any modifications to this Contract and the lack of agreement is not subject to Article 31 [i.e., dispute resolution].
